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Abstract This paper demonstrates the political perspective
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures and,
drawing on Weber’s notion of traditionalism, seeks to
explain what motivates companies to make such disclo-
sures in a traditional setting. Annual reports of 23 banking
companies in Bangladesh are analysed over the period
2009–2012. This is supplemented by a review of docu-
mentary evidence on the political and social activities of
corporations and reports published in national and inter-
national newspapers. We found that, in the banking com-
panies over the period of study, apparently neutral,
corporate, philanthropic activities disclosed and promoted
in CSR reports are inextricably linked to powerful leaders’
personal projects and the ruling party’s agendas. We have
demonstrated elements of traditional societies, including
personal loyalty and the public display of loyalty, the
master–servant relationship, and obedience to personal
rather than formal authority, provide an understanding of
why banks (with or without explicit political linkages with
the ruling party) have employed politically charged CSR
disclosure strategies. The paper contributes to disclosure
studies where political motivations of corporate disclosure
rarely discussed. The paper extends the debate on political
CSR by demonstrating that the role of family and familial
values at the organisational and national levels may be
much more important when it comes to CSR disclosure and
activities.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility disclosures 
Traditionalism  Politics  Families  Traditional settings 
Bangladesh
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the political perspective of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures. Research
on CSR disclosures, in general, has received attention from
academics, policymakers, practitioners and wider stake-
holder groups (Mathews 1997; Parker 2005; Owen 2008;
Deegan 2014). It has been argued that, while CSR may be a
strategy for redistributing income from corporations to the
general public, paradoxically CSR disclosures may poten-
tially provide a setting for political interests and patronage
(Cooper and Owen 2007). However, the political per-
spective of CSR is under-theorised (Whelan 2012) and has
rarely appeared in disclosure studies (Gu et al. 2013). This
paper aims to fill this gap in drawing on the disclosures of
corporations.
The prevalence of political interests and patronage in
corporations is well noted in the literature (Muthuri and
Gilbert 2011; Chapple and Moon 2007; Prechel and Morris
2010; Walker and Rea 2014; Lux et al. 2011). The political
ties of corporations and their influence on corporate con-
duct take different shapes and forms, depending on the
institutional and political settings of the countries in which
they operate (Matten and Moon 2008; Dieleman and
Boddewyn 2012). Previous studies have argued that
countries with under-developed democratic institutions,
family-led politics and poverty, which are more likely to be
prevalent in traditional settings (Tsamenyi and Uddin
2008), create the necessary conditions for strong political
ties between political elites and businesses (Berglo¨f and
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Claessens 2006; Dieleman and Boddewyn 2012).1 For
instance, Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) found that
business groups in Indonesia are both highly dependent on
governments to secure key resources, and face a unique set
of risks associated with political ties. Similarly, Yadav
(2011) has argued that the close relationship between
political parties and business groups enables political elites
to strongly influence corporate conduct in emerging
economies.
Previous studies have demonstrated that the social,
economic, cultural and political context of corporations is
an important factor leading to differences in CSR across
nations (Matten and Moon 2008; Chapple and Moon
2007). Matten and Moon (2008) found that CSR differ-
ences in Europe and the USA are due largely to underlying
institutional and contextual features embedded in busi-
nesses. Focusing on the human rights practices of ten
Chinese state-owned enterprises, Whelan and Muthuri
(forthcoming) found that pressures at national and intra-
organisational levels are critical to conforming with
international guidelines on human rights. Given that cor-
porate conduct is often influenced by state politics and
political elites, corporations are likely to employ CSR
disclosures to seek out and manage political ties (Gu et al.
2013; Muthuri and Gilbert 2011; Chapple and Moon
2007).2 Against this background, this paper examines
whether corporations in traditional settings exploit CSR
disclosures to seek out and manage political ties and, if so,
how. It also explores how the political nature of CSR
disclosures might be explained.
The Bangladeshi situation is particularly useful for
developing our understanding of political perspectives of
CSR disclosures. Firstly, the nature of politics and
democracy in Bangladesh provides a unique opportunity to
shed light on the use of CSR disclosures and its connection
with political regimes (Uddin and Hopper 2001). The
country has a fragile democratic system, and is subject to
frequent violent confrontations between two family-led
political parties (Uddin and Choudhury 2008). Secondly, a
striking feature of businesses in Bangladesh is the exis-
tence of political patronage. It is claimed that political
identity plays a crucial role in the process of granting
licences to businesses (Uddin and Hopper 2003; Kochanek
2000). Thirdly, conditions such as under-developed
democratic institutions, poverty, family ownership, lack of
institutional investors, and weak capital markets in Ban-
gladesh are well noted in the literature (Uddin and
Choudhury 2008).3
Empirically, this paper focuses on banking companies in
Bangladesh to investigate patterns of CSR disclosure and
the influence of politics. Banks are considered to be the
engine room and key to economic development and pov-
erty alleviation in poorer countries (Beck et al. 2011). Both
state and private banks must operate within the strict
guidelines of various regulatory bodies, including the
central bank. Their CSR activities attract special attention
from policymakers and academics, perhaps in view of the
role that financial institutions are supposed to play in
economic development. Since 1990, there has been phe-
nomenal growth in banks in emerging economies, which
has attracted considerable public attention in recent years
(World Bank 2005). Nevertheless, the study of CSR dis-
closures by financial institutions, especially in emerging
economies, remains neglected (Khan et al. 2011).
Theoretically, this study draws on Weber’s notion of
‘‘traditionalism’’ to develop a broader understanding of the
political perspectives of CSR disclosures. We examine
whether elements of traditionalism provide deeper insights
into political aspects of the CSR disclosure practices of
banking companies in Bangladesh. Studies such as those by
Uddin and Chowdhury (2008) and Dyball and Valcarcel
(1999) draw heavily on Weber’s thought, and this paper
contributes to the tradition of Weberian explanations of
accounting practices. This is further explained and justified
in later sections.
The paper begins with a brief review of previous studies
of CSR disclosures and the role of politics, followed by a
section on traditionalism. It then provides a brief historical
and cultural background to the Bangladeshi banking sector,
and a description of the research methods used in this
study. The empirical findings are presented and discussed,
and conclusions are drawn in the final section.
CSR, Disclosures and Politics
While early CSR disclosure studies focused on the general
nature of social and environmental reporting issues
(Hackston and Milne 1996; Mathews 1997), a growing
body of research is focusing on specific CSR issues and
associated disclosures. For instance, recent CSR disclosure
1 In this paper, the term ‘‘traditional setting’’ is used interchangeably
with ‘‘emerging economy’’ or ‘‘poorer country’’. Weber (1978)
articulates traditional settings as those in which traditional values
supersede a rational and legalistic model of society and economy.
Democracy, politics and state machineries are overpowered by family
values and connections, leading to under-developed markets and
institutions. Personal loyalty, obedience, obligations to personal chief
and being subject to a superior are necessary elements to maintain a
traditional society and economic activities.
2 Political ties may involve relationships with the ruling party,
polities, elites and even the head of the government.
3 Institutional shareholding is fragmented. Uddin and Choudhury
(2008) found that only 5.81 per cent of shares are held by 88
institutions in the top 20 performing companies on the Dhaka Stock
Exchange.
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studies have drawn attention to sustainability reporting
(Byrch et al. 2015; Higgins et al. 2014; Tregidga et al.
2014; Milne and Gray 2013), climate change and
accounting for bio-diversity (see special issues of Ac-
counting, Auditing & Accountability Journal in 2013 and
2014, respectively), human rights accounting (see special
issue of Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal in
2016), and anti-corruption or anti-bribery disclosures (see
Islam et al. 2016).
Previous studies on CSR disclosures have reported a
number of drivers/motivations, including market, commu-
nity and stakeholder influence (Dhaliwal et al. 2011;
Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Cooper and Owen 2007). A
significant number of studies has been devoted to under-
standing CSR disclosures in relation to legitimacy in wider
society and stakeholders’ interests (Guthrie and Parker
1989; Deegan 2002; Bebbington et al. 2008; Deegan 2014).
Laine (2009, 2010) has demonstrated how companies have
changed the rhetoric of environmental disclosures and
sustainability-related concepts over the years in order to
maintain a legitimate position in wider society. While
longitudinal studies offer opportunities to research poten-
tial links between changing political ideologies and CSR
disclosures, the politically motivated CSR disclosures of
corporations remains under-researched within the
accounting literature.
Within the business ethics and business and society lit-
erature, research has increasingly been conducted on
political CSR, although this has concentrated mainly on the
political duties and activities of corporations, and MNCs in
particular (e.g. Crane et al. 2008; Hsieh 2009; Palazzo and
Scherer 2006). Within this normative tradition, researchers
find that Western MNCs play positive roles in societies
(Scherer et al. 2006, 2009). It has been suggested that
increased globalisation has resulted in a decline in the
power of the state, thereby allowing MNCs to step into that
role (Whelan 2012). Whelan (2012) offers a robust critique
to this stream of research and calls for ‘critical’ research
into the political CSR agenda. He critiques three aspects:
wrongly equating globalisation with diminished capacities
of the state; assuming that MNC motivations can, do or
might oscillate between a rational profit-seeking and pro-
social logic; and the existence of a political model of
corporate governance facilitating MNCs’ CSR activities
(Whelan 2012, p. 710).
Although our study draws on national companies and
their disclosure patterns to articulate the political aspects of
disclosure, it does offer support for Whelan’s critique of
political CSR. We share wider views on political CSR
which argue that different CSR contexts and challenges,
such as poverty, labour standards, bases of governmental
power and legitimacy, cultural traditions and historical
factors, are likely to be crucial to corporations’ CSR
activities (Chapple and Moon 2007). We argue that the
nature and capacities of the state or family-led state (in
case of traditional societies) continue to exert a strong
influence over corporate conduct, including CSR (Uddin
and Choudhury 2008).
Early CSR studies of emerging economies were
descriptive in nature and mainly exhibited a low level of
CSR disclosure (Tsang 1998; Hegde et al. 1997; Jaggi
and Zhao 1996). Later studies have focused on identify-
ing the drivers of CSR in corporations (Momin and
Parker 2013; Belal and Roberts 2010; Islam and Deegan
2008). International pressure from national and interna-
tional media, foreign partners and donors has been found
to be a significant driver of CSR disclosure in Bangla-
desh only in internationally linked companies (Siddiqui
and Uddin 2016; Islam and Deegan 2008). Nevertheless,
the political motivations of CSR disclosures do not seem
to feature in the above studies, with the exception of Gu
et al.’s (2013) work, which demonstrates that stronger
political connections lead to greater adoption of CSR
disclosures.
The political motivations of CSR disclosures need fur-
ther examination and theorisation, given the critical role
that politics play in shaping corporate conduct (Berglo¨f and
Claessens 2006; Yadav 2011). This paper responds to
Whelan’s (2012) call to explain political CSR through a
range of more sophisticated theories. We draw on Weber’s
concept of ‘‘traditionalism’’, embodying elements such as
family, kinship, personal loyalty and master–servant rela-
tionships that influence the operating practices of corpo-
rations, including CSR. This will be further discussed in
the next section.
Weber’s Notion of ‘‘Traditionalism’’ and CSR
Weber emphasises the importance of social, economic,
cultural and historical factors in shaping a particular form
of society (such as traditionalist), and their implications
for organisational accountability and transparency. For
instance, he sees rational capitalism as having been only
partially realised in the Western industrial revolutions of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He also recog-
nises traditional forms of capitalism that exist throughout
the world even now and which were evident in Europe
until the eighteenth century (Uddin and Choudhury 2008,
p. 1029). Weber’s (1923) work on Indian societies argues
that the suppression of intra-community (Weber terms it
‘Demiurgie’) and promotion of inter-community division
of labour under the patrimonial political domination
have strengthened traditional societies and subverted
the money economy and rational capitalism. The
development of intra-community division of labour
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(Demiurgie)4 in Europe gradually changes its form into
the Demiurgie of a money economy. In India and other
Asiatic societies, the development of Demiurgie was
blocked at its first beginnings by the patrimonial states/
tribal lords. Instead inter-community division of labour
was promoted within the political domain of a patrimo-
nial state or a tribal lord. In India, it was later reinforced
by the caste system (Otsuka 1966).
Traditional societies exhibit economic activities pro-
moting the property and productive capacities of individual
economic units geared primarily towards satisfying the
needs and preferences of the master or family/clan (Dyball
and Valcarcel 1999). This has been demonstrated in many
societies, including Bangladesh (Uddin and Choudhury
2008). Personal loyalty, obedience, obligations to personal
chief and being subject to a superior are necessary elements
in maintaining a traditional society and economic activi-
ties. According to Weber (1947):
The person exercising authority is not a ‘‘superior’’,
but a personal ‘‘chief’’. His administrative staff does
not consist primarily of officials, but of personal
retainers. Those subject to authority are not ‘‘mem-
bers’’ of an association, but are either his traditional
‘‘comrades’’ or his ‘‘subjects’’. What determines the
relations of the administrative staff to the chief is not
the impersonal obligations of office, but personal
loyalty to the chief. Obedience is not owed to enacted
rules, but to the person who occupies a position of
authority… who has been chosen for such a position
(Weber 1947, p. 341).
Traditionalism is further clarified by Uddin and
Choudhury (2008) and Dyball and Valcarcel (1999).
Referring to Weber’s work, the latter argue that:
The ‘‘master’’ is expected to do good turns, governed
by an ethical common sense of equity or of utilitarian
expediency. His exercise of power is bound only by
resistance from his ‘‘subjects’’. It is impossible then
for an ‘‘impartial’’ law or administrative rule to be
intentionally created by legislation (p. 307).
Traditionalism seems to stand in the way of the ideal
development of markets and makes rational capitalism
difficult to develop. Weber’s (1923) work advances these
arguments, focusing on traditional communities in Indian
villages (McLane 1993). The break-up of traditional social
relations in early European societies was led by the intra-
community division of labour and the rise of occupational
communities, which in turn led to a money economy and the
development of capitalism in Western countries. In con-
trast, intra-community division of labour and occupational
communities in Asian and African societies were thwarted
by the caste system in India and by various geographical
and economic conditions and tribal relations in other soci-
eties (McLane 1993; Hart 1982; Hopkins 1976).
Drawing on Weber’s (1978) characterisation of rational
and traditional societies, Dyball et al. (2006, p. 53) high-
light further differences between the two, arguing, in
Weberian terms, that the institutions of community, market
and state are conjoined in traditional societies. Several key
elements of traditionalism appear to constitute traditional
societies, including personal loyalty and the public display
of loyalty, the master–servant relationship, and obedience
to personal rather than formal authority. We examine
whether these elements enable us to explain the CSR
practices of Bangladeshi banks. In adding to the theoretical
lenses appropriated for disclosure (Deegan 2002, 2014) and
political CSR studies (Whelan 2012), we would argue that
Weber’s work on traditionalism is pertinent to under-
standing political aspects of CSR disclosures in traditional
societies such as Bangladesh.5 This is justified below.
Firstly, the development of an ideal form of capitalism
in Bangladesh and other traditional societies has been
thwarted by various historical and cultural mediations,
including British and other colonial interventions, religious
interventions and families (Weber 1923; Uddin and Hopper
2001). Elements of traditionalism such as family domina-
tions are deeply rooted in traditional societies, as in Ban-
gladesh, and extend to organisational settings (Uddin 2009;
BEI 2004). Thus, elements of traditionalism such as per-
sonal loyalty or obedience to personal rather than formal
authority will be useful notions to explain organisational
practices including disclosure patterns in family-dominated
businesses.
Secondly, the two family-led political parties have
controlled state power since the independence of Bangla-
desh in 1971 (Mannan 2011). The confrontational politics
pursued by these two leading political parties have led to
the capture of state-run institutions while in power (Uddin
and Choudhury 2008). The family-led state dominates both
private and public corporations (BEI 2004). Weber’s tra-
ditional societies exhibit a similar feature, so it would be
useful to examine how the ruling party and its powerful
leaders influence the CSR practices of corporations from
the perspective of traditionalism. Interestingly, this notion
of the power of the family-led state runs contrary to ideas
expressed in much of the political CSR literature (critically
4 This refers to that state of social division of labour in which
workers other than farming comprehended within the land occupancy
relations of the traditional community. These workers include
carpenters, blacksmith, potters, barbers, etc. They are found to serve
the village community.
5 Institutional theories (Whelan and Muthuri forthcoming; Muthuri
and Gilbert 2011) and resource dependency theory (Dieleman and
Boddewyn 2012) have been appropriated in this stream of research.
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see Whelan 2012; Whelan and Muthuri forthcoming) that
the diminished role of the state is replaced by MNCs and
international agencies (e.g. international non-government
organisations such as Amnesty International, inter-gov-
ernmental organisations such as the UN) in promoting and
enforcing CSR standards (e.g. Scherer and Palazzo 2011).
Thirdly, factors driving CSR disclosures in traditional
societies may not be the same as in advanced societies. The
use of legitimacy and stakeholder theories has benefited
CSR studies, but a more thorough explanation of the use of
disclosures is necessary, especially for emerging econo-
mies. Legitimacy to the state and wider stakeholders may
be of significant value to corporate managers in Western
countries (Deegan 2002). Appeasing wider stakeholders
may also be significant for corporations in Western coun-
tries (Deegan and Blomquist 2006). However, it is ques-
tionable whether the idea of legitimacy to wider
stakeholders, contrary to much of the political CSR liter-
ature, has any attraction for corporations in traditional
settings, given that the nature and power of the state and
state-like bodies are personified in familial politics.
Works by Uddin and Choudhury (2008) and Uddin
(2009) demonstrate that managers of even stock market-
listed companies in Bangladesh seem to serve the interests
of sponsoring directors (and their families), often at the
expense of majority shareholders and other stakeholders.
Hence, activities are directed towards the ‘‘master’’ rather
than wider society, further strengthening the bond between
‘‘master’’ and ‘‘servant’’. The relationship between the
ruling party and corporations is perhaps better captured in
‘‘master-servant’’ relationship providing deeper explana-
tions of CSR disclosures practised by companies located in
traditional settings.
Finally, previous studies have demonstrated the useful-
ness of Weber’s works for accounting, especially in the
areas of the development of accounting knowledge and
professions, accounting controls and corporate governance
(Chua and Poullaos 1998; Caramanis 2005; Dyball et al.
2006). Nevertheless, the CSR disclosure literature has not
made use of Weber’s work. We believe that Weber’s
notions of rationality and traditionalism have much to offer
to disclosure studies. The use of ‘‘traditionalism’’ in the
accounting literature is not new, but the use of this theo-
retical idea in the context of capitalistic firms located in
traditional settings perhaps has more promise in explaining
disclosure practices.
Research Methods
Our research attempts to discern political elements in
reported CSR disclosure items. In a study such as this, the
accurate identification of CSR disclosures of a political
nature is crucial. We used thematic content analysis6 based
on phrases to identify the nature of the CSR disclosures
(Weber 1990). The method adopted in our study was
inspired by previous studies (Campbell and Abdul Rahman
2010; Samkin et al. 2014). Samkin et al. (2014) used text
units, ranging from a short sentence to individual para-
graphs, to identify specific themes which were then clas-
sified into three broad categories. In our case, two of the
authors identified political contributions and statements
through a close reading of the annual reports, CSR reports
and websites of the banking companies. To ensure the
consistency and reliability of the process, disagreements
were resolved through a close reading by the third author.
We have reviewed the company reports for the period
2009–2012 of all listed and non-listed local banks operat-
ing in Bangladesh (a total of 39 banks). Of the 39 local
banks, 16 banks (two state-owned, nine private and five
development banks) either did not produce any information
on their CSR activities or produced insufficient information
to warrant inclusion in our further investigations. There-
fore, our final analysis is based on 23 banks over a period
of 4 years (2009–2012, 92 firm-years). In 2008, the central
bank (Bangladesh Bank) initiated a drive to mainstream
CSR engagements in the banking sector. As part of this
initiative, the Bangladesh Bank started to publish an annual
review of the CSR expenditure of banks in Bangladesh,
although this is only available for 2008–2011. Hence, we
chose to analyse the CSR data of banks since 2009.
However, due to the lack of availability of recent (post-
2012) CSR data, the analysis presented in this study is
limited to a period of 4 years (2009–2012).
In addition to company reports and announcements, we
spent considerable time in collecting additional documen-
tary evidence, such as newspaper reports relating to politi-
cal announcements, and banking disclosures appearing in
the national and international media during the sample
period. Newspaper search engines provided information
regarding key management personnel in the banks to enable
political connections to be traced (presented in Table 1).
Another important source of information on banking dis-
closures was institutional reports, such as central bank
annual disclosure review documents, government circulars
on fiscal incentives, and the International Finance Corpo-
ration’s (IFC’s) framework or Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) published during the study period. Information from
the above sources was crucial in understanding the expec-
tations of CSR disclosures from key stakeholders such as
the central bank and international partners.
Skippari’s (2005) framework was employed as a
guideline to identify the politically connected disclosure
6 Weber (1990) defines themes as a cluster of words with different
meanings or connotations that, when taken together, form an issue.
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Table 1 Political links of banks
Bank Political
affiliation
Explicit political link
Panel A: political links of existing banks (Source: profiles of directors disclosed in annual reports of banking companies)
Private banks
AB Bank No
Al Arafah Bank No
Bank Asia Yes Former minister’s family members in BoD
BCBL No
BRAC Bank No
City Bank Yes Former MP is the founding Chairman of the BoD. Two sons are on the BoD
Dhaka Bank Yes Founding chairman is a former MP
Dutch Bangla Bank No
EBL No
Exim Bank No
First Security No
ICB Islamic Bank No
IFIC Bank Yes Chairman of the BoD is a current MP
Islami Bank Yes Several members in BoD are linked with a political party
Jamuna Bank Yes Key member of the BoD is a current MP
Mercantile Bank Yes Chairman of the BoD is a current MP
Mutual Trust Bank No
National Bank Yes Founding chairman of the BoD is a former MP
NCC Bank Yes Chairman of the BoD is an elected leader of the chamber of commerce and industry and associated
with the ruling party
One Bank No
Premier Bank Yes Chairman of the BoD is a current MP
Prime Bank Yes Chairman of the BoD is linked with ex Prime Minister
Pubali Bank Yes Chairman of the BoD is a current MP
Shahjalal Bank No
Social Islami bank No
Southeast Bank No
Standard Bank
Limited
Yes Chairman is an advisor to a major political party
Trust Bank No
UCBL Yes Chairman of the BoD is a current MP
Uttara Bank No
State Banks
Sonali Bank Yes Chairman is a pro-government academic (contested university senate elections from the pro-
government panel)
Agrani Bank Yes Chairman is a pro-government academic (was a former president of the university teachers’
association, contested university senate elections from the pro-government panel)
Rupali Bank Yes Chairman is a political appointee (members of the political party)
Janata Bank Yes Chairman is a pro-government academic (contested university senate elections from the pro-
government panel)
Development Banks
Bangladesh Krishi
Bank
No
Karnasangsthan
Bank
Yes Chairman of the BoD is politically linked with the ruling regime
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items. Skippari (2005) identifies five categories of corpo-
rate political activity: election funding and petitions,
executive lobbying, advocacy, advertising and coalition
building. These categories7 enabled us to group disclosure
items. Given corporations are not allowed to provide
election funding to political parties in Bangladesh, in our
content analysis, we could only use the latter four cate-
gories of political activity. Our analysis identified 252
incidences of such politically connected disclosures during
the sample period. These were then transferred to a coding
spreadsheet. The coding process involved identifying
specific themes which would fall into these four categories.
Of the 252 incidents of corporate political activity, none
fell into the ‘‘advocacy’’ category, and there was only one
example of the ‘‘advertising’’ category.8 The rest fell into
two categories: executive lobbying and coalition building.
This initial grouping of politically connected disclosure
items helped us to identify two most frequently recurring
themes. They were ‘‘contributions supporting the ruling
party’s agendas’’ (advertising and coalition building cate-
gory9) and ‘‘contributions to personal projects of leaders’’
(executive lobbying category10). Examples of CSR activi-
ties that fell into these two major recurring themes are as
follows:
1. Contributions supporting the ruling party’s agendas
Disclosure items supporting the ruling party (Awami
League) election manifestos and projects were grouped
under this category.11 We found plenty of evidence of
this type of CSR disclosure. Two items disclosed most
frequently in annual reports were donations to the
Liberation War Museum and donations to the Bangla-
desh Rifles (BDR) tragedy. Donations to the Liberation
Table 1 continued
Bank Political
affiliation
Explicit political link
RAKUB No
Bangladesh
Development Bank
Yes Chairman of the BoD is associated with the ruling party
BASIC Bank
Limited
Yes Chairman of the BoD is a current MP
Panel B: political links of six new banks in 2013 (Source: The Daily Star 2012)
Union Bank Limited Yes Major shareholders include a former President of Bangladesh, who is currently in the ruling party
alliance
Modhumati Bank
Limited
Yes Major shareholders include a current MP
Meghna Bank Limited Yes Major shareholders include a current MP
The Farmers’ Bank
Limited
Yes Proposed chairman is a current MP
South Bangla Yes Sponsor shareholder—a current MP
Midland Bank Limited Yes Key shareholder is a politically affiliated former bureaucrat, also the chairman of the BoD of the
Karnasangsthan Bank, a development bank
BoD Board of directors
7 Skippari’s paper provides examples of political actions that fall
under each of these categories. For example, ‘petitions’ involve
sending formal communication to government as a response to
increased government regulations; ‘coalition building’ includes
actions taken to build a coalition with the government; ‘advocacy
advertising’ involves attempts to indirectly support political views by
influencing broader public opinion; ‘executive lobbying’ refers to
actions taken by executives to personally contact political decision
makers.
8 In 2009, Southeast Bank ran an advertisement in national dailies
congratulating the prime minister on receiving the ‘‘South-South’’
award.
9 According to Skippari (2005), ‘coalition building’ is a tactic to
improve collective power. Skippari (2005) notes that coalitions
between business executives and politicians can be of a temporary,
issue-by-issue nature or a more permanent nature (for example,
formulating a trade association that supports a particular political
view). This is where the company executives and the politicians take
collective actions to pursue a particular agenda.
10 Executive lobbying refers to attempts made by corporate execu-
tives to ‘personally’ contact political decision makers (Skippari
2005). Skippari (2005) notes that the executive lobbying strategy can
be more commonly observed in some countries (mainly traditional
settings), in which ‘personal connections between business executives
and politicians’ have been traditionally close (Katzenstein 1985;
Murtha and Lenway 1994).
11 We acknowledge that differentiating political parties’ projects and
politicians’ personal projects is not straightforward in a family-led
political context. Nevertheless, we have relied on current election
manifestos and the ideological positions of the ruling party to identify
contributions supporting the ruling party’s agendas.
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures, Traditionalism and Politics: A Story from a… 415
123
War Museum had been mentioned in the election
manifesto of the ruling party, while the BDR tragedy
was used as a vehicle to repair differences between the
army and the ruling party. Examples drawn from
annual reports of contributions supporting the ruling
party’s agendas include ‘‘the bank made a donation of
Tk 50 lacs (Tk 5 million) for the Mukitjoddha Jadughar
[the Liberation War Museum] (IFIC Bank Annual
Report 2010, p. 15); ‘‘Rupali Bank Limited sponsored
National Media Ltd. to make and broadcast two rare
exclusive documentaries named ‘Nine Months to
Freedom’ (58 min colour) and ‘Meeting a Milestone’
(28 min colour) and footage of the War of Liberation
and [the father of the nation] on different media in
December, 2010. It helped reveal new evidence of our
struggle for independence and the unparalleled lead-
ership of [the father of the nation]’’ (Rupali Bank
Annual Report 2010, p. 109).
2. Contributions to personal projects of leaders Items
indicating close/personal relationships with leading
political families were grouped under this category.
Most CSR disclosure items were found to be associ-
ated with powerful leaders of the ruling party. These
included items such as one-off payments to organisa-
tions named after members of the ruling party, and
contributions to projects actively supported and spon-
sored by such members. Two of the most frequent
disclosures broadly within this theme included dona-
tions to victims of Nimtoli (prime minister’s personal
call) and contributions to autism causes (prime min-
ister’s daughter’s involvement). Instances of such
reports include ‘‘Donation to Sheikh Jamal Club
Limited [a club named after the current PM’s
brother—undisclosed amount]’’ (Jamuna Bank Annual
Report 2011, p. 163) and ‘‘Pubali Bank has donated an
amount of Tk 2.5 million to the Prime Minister’s relief
and welfare fund to help the Nimtoli tragedy victims’’
(Pubali Bank Annual Report 2010, p. 25).
The above categorisations are useful for identifying and
classifying politically charged disclosures. These patterns
of disclosure enable us to understand the influence of
family-led state politics. Weber’s notion of traditionalism
provides further explanation of why personal loyalty is
more important in driving disclosures than pressure from
multilateral agencies (e.g. IFC, UN, Climate Change
campaign).
Furthermore, Weber’s methodologies inspired us to
examine external layers (structural and historical condi-
tions) which might shed light on organisational practices,
in this case CSR. In order to understand the influence of
traditionalism on CSR disclosure practices, we reviewed
the political and social literature, as well as articles
published in national and international newspapers, to gain
an understanding of the historical and structural contexts in
which these organisations were located. According to
Weber, these are separate but interacting methodologies.
The following sections discuss the historical and cultural
conditions of Bangladeshi financial institutions and the
CSR practices of banking companies.
Traditionalism, Politics and Banking
in Bangladesh
Bangladesh (then called East Bengal), a part of India, was
ruled by both Muslim and Hindu emperors for centuries.
East Bengal and other parts of India were composed mainly
of village communities led by local kings forming pater-
nalistic states (Weber 1923). The mode of production was
mainly farming. Intra-community labour division was not
fully developed into money economy but promoted occu-
pational labour communities to serve their localities con-
trolled by the paternalistic states/tribal lords. This was
further fixed by the cast systems in India. The arrival of the
East India Company (1757) and the British India (1857)
did not change the traditional power base arising from
village communities but further reinforced the power
structure, such as the power of zamindars or landlords
(McLane 1993). The traditional local power base was
conducive to producing raw materials for British industries
whilst simultaneously maintaining traditional communities
(McLane 1993). In 1945, Bangladesh became part of
Pakistan and was known as East Pakistan. The new country
began to industrialise by encouraging families, through
various incentives, to make protected investments. The
emergence of family entrepreneurs was unsurprising given
the strength of families/clans in societies even in twentieth-
century West and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). How-
ever, discriminatory economic development agendas by the
ruling regime originated from West Pakistan promoted few
West Pakistani families to own most of the industrial assets
of Pakistan (Humphrey 1987). As a result, only a handful
of West Pakistani families dominated the corporate sector
of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) during the 24 years of
the Pakistan period. Soon or just before the independence
of Bangladesh, most of these Pakistani families left Ban-
gladesh partly because of fear of retaliation by Banglade-
shis. This led to a vacuum, with an underdevelopment of
local capital markets and a lack of private capital, when
Bangladesh finally became independent in 1971 (Khan
1986).
After a brief period of ‘‘state capitalism’’ in Bangladesh
(Uddin and Hopper 2001), the state, governed by family-
led political parties (Uddin and Choudhury 2008) and
dictated by global, political and economic conditions,
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began to sell public enterprises to individuals/families,
giving rise to crony capitalism. Weber’s (1923, 1978)
works suggest similar outcomes: the structural conditions
for rational capitalism struggle in the context of tradition-
alism, as in the strong presence of family and clan culture
(Dyball et al. 2006; Dyball and Valcarcel 1999). Weber
(1978) recognised the effects of familial or clan ownership
on external accountability (Uddin 2009, p. 786). This has
also been reported in previous studies. As Uddin and
Hopper (2003, p. 768) report, ‘‘coupled to poor financial
regulation and legal enforcement and weak capital mar-
kets, it was a breeding ground for crony capitalism asso-
ciated with familial transacting, patronage, and irregular
financial practices’’. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) argue
that this poor form of governance and accountability is also
linked with post-independence Bangladesh’s family-led
political parties.
Since independence, Bangladesh has been ruled pre-
dominantly by two major family-led political parties: the
Sheikh Mujib family leads the Bangladesh Awami League,
and the Zia family leads the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
The leaders of both parties inherited their positions in the
political arena from deceased leaders. Unsurprisingly,
resonating with traditionalism, neither political party is
known for practising democratic norms. The parties appear
to be controlled mainly by their kin and relatives (Mannan
2006; Sobhan and Ahmad 1980). The eldest sons of both
leaders have been brought into politics and groomed to take
over from their ‘‘mothers’’ (Mannan 2011).12 Heredity
politics shape both local and national leadership and
economy.
Political factionalism and the personification of state
institutions are rife in Bangladesh. The increasing influence
of tribunes (protectors/champions/heads of clan) and their
family members puts pressure on the existing public
institutions of state and civil society, resulting in disor-
ganisation and deinstitutionalisation (Mannan 1992, p. 52).
Previous studies have argued that, when these families
come into power, they themselves erode the constitution
and institutions at all levels (Hyden 1983; Mannan 1992,
p. 52). The Institute of Governance Studies (2008) reports
that, in a culture of political confrontation leading to
patron–client relationships, the ruling party attempts to
create loyalty and allegiance to state institutions, resulting
in the widespread politicisation of such institutions, espe-
cially in their bureaucracy. Political division is so deeply
rooted that even candidates contesting elections of a non-
political nature (for example, elections for professional
bodies such as a university teachers’ association, doctors’
association, engineers’ association, supreme court bar
association, journalists’ association, etc.) will need to have
direct backing from one of the parties. Both parties have
student factions in higher educational institutions and
labour unions in all state-owned entities (Uddin and Hop-
per 2001).
The confrontational politics pursued by these two
leading political parties have led to the creation of a culture
that permits only wealthy people to be elected to public
offices. While many politicians think the easiest way to
earn money is through business, many businessmen believe
seeking and maintaining political ties will help them
expand their business (Zaman 2011). Active participation
in politics by businessmen is quite common which has
reflected in past parliamentary elections in Bangladesh.
According to the declarations of candidates, 68 per cent of
members of parliament elected in 2008 were businessmen
(The Daily Star 2015). Mahmud et al. (2008) point out that
a parliament dominated by businessmen contributed to the
strong political ties between family-led political parties and
businesses. As a result, political patronage has become
almost a necessary condition for obtaining government
permission to operate in banking, media and the emerging
telecommunications sector.
Any change in the composition of state political lead-
ership invariably leads to a reshuffling of every sector,
including banking, in such a way that party loyalists
receive maximum benefits (Khan 2003). Uddin and
Choudhury (2008) argue that loyalty to families, rather
than the application of professional judgment, skills and
expertise, plays an important role in career advancement.
Business opportunities depend not on commercial success
but on exhibitions of public loyalty to the family in power.
It would be unsurprising to see senior bank officials in
Bangladesh employing CSR activities and disclosure as
vehicles through which to demonstrate loyalty to the
elected party/family. These issues will be examined more
closely in connection with CSR disclosures in banking
institutions.
An interesting, and perhaps unique feature of the
banking sector in Bangladesh is the banks’ explicit political
affiliations. At present, there are 39 banks (excluding six
newly approved banks and Grameen Bank)13 operating in
Bangladesh: four state-owned, 30 private, nine foreign and
five specialist development banks.
Table 1 Panel A presents some explicit political links of
local banks in Bangladesh. Twenty-one out of 39 local
banks seem to have some form of connection with the
ruling regime or other political parties through their
12 Khaleda Zia leads the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, with her son,
Tareq Rahman (Zia) standing in line; Sheikh Hasina (Wazed) leads
the Awami League, with her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy in line.
13 Unlike other banks in Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank was
promulgated by a special Grameen Bank Ordinance, 1983, and does
not fall under the purview of the Banking Companies Act, 1991.
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chairman, sponsor director or influential board members
being members of parliament, party members or vocal
supporters of a political party. Table 1 Panel B illustrates
that all six newly approved banks are connected with the
ruling party, with sponsor directors/key shareholders being
current parliament members or high-profile political lead-
ers (Siddiqui 2010; The Daily Star 2012). The finance
minister publicly admitted: ‘‘it is our political decision to
issue licenses for new banks in the country despite reser-
vations made by the Bangladesh Bank’’ (The Financial
Express 2011). Banks without explicit political links do not
necessarily make less politically charged disclosures, but
the above table nonetheless highlights a unique feature of
the banking establishment in Bangladesh. The next sections
focus on CSR disclosures and their likely connections with
politics.
CSR Disclosures and Politics
CSR disclosures are voluntary for listed and non-listed
companies in Bangladesh, as in many other countries.
Nevertheless, certain incentives have been put in place,
especially for banking companies, through fiscal regula-
tions and central bank directives. The central bank of
Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank) formed a partnership with
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) soon after the
Copenhagen climate change conference in 2009. Bangla-
desh has been identified as one of the most vulnerable
countries to climate change. Financing incentives were
declared by the IFC and Bangladesh Bank to encourage
commercial banks to engage with environmentally friendly
projects (The Financial Express 2009). Furthermore, the
Bangladesh Bank issued a circular identifying a number of
priority areas for CSR (Bangladesh Bank 2008).14
Although adoption of the CSR guidelines is voluntary, the
central bank mentioned that these would be taken into
consideration when evaluating banks’ performance (Ban-
gladesh Bank 2008). The Bangladesh government also set
out fiscal incentives for CSR expenditure for all public
limited companies. For instance, companies are allowed to
claim a tax rebate of ten per cent of CSR expenditures
(GoB 2009).
The ruling party subsequently extended the scope of the
rebate in 2011, issuing a new government directive which
includes three new areas of CSR activities qualifying for
CSR tax rebates: donations to the Liberation War Museum,
donations to the Father of the Nation memorial and con-
tributions to the prime minister’s Education Fund.15
Interestingly, the first two items were pre-election com-
mitments. The following section presents a descriptive
account of disclosures by segment and scrutinises likely
links with politics.
Disclosures by Segment
Bangladesh Bank produces a yearly review of CSR dis-
closures made by commercial banks in Bangladesh.
Table 2 Panel A presents data for 2008 to 2011. A sig-
nificant proportion of the banks’ CSR disclosures were
devoted to the education, health, disaster management, arts
and culture, and sports sectors. There were significant
successive increases in the CSR disclosures of the banks in
2009 and 2010 and a slight decrease in 2011. In 2011, total
CSR expenditure amounted to 2.40 % of after tax profits.16
The most significant increase in CSR disclosures was in
2010, when CSR expenditures experienced a three-fold
increase compared with 2009. To investigate this further,
we examined the classification of CSR disclosures by
segment for 2010. Table 2 Panel B ranks the CSR seg-
ments in terms of the relative increase in CSR expenditure
in a particular segment compared with 2009.
The greatest increase in 2010 was observed in the arts
and culture segment. This phenomenal increase was trig-
gered by donations for the Liberation War Museum pre-
sented in the arts and culture category. The Liberation War
Museum was established in 1996 but its support became an
election promise of the ruling party during the election in
2009. Apart from donations made to the Liberation War
Museum, several banks also made significant grants to
organisations and individuals with explicit political links
(examples included donations to children’s foundations and
football clubs named after family members of the ruling
party, and donations towards preparing a documentary and
a book on the life of the current prime minister’s father,
who led Bangladesh to independence).
The second highest increase in CSR spending in 2010
was on sport. However, this is mainly attributable to
donations made to the government for organising the South
Asian Federation Games, hosted by Bangladesh in 2010.
Nevertheless, some banks also sponsored various sports
bodies in Bangladesh, and two banks made donations to
14 Priority areas include financing programmes to encourage biomass
and solar power projects, credit programmes for the diversified
production of crops, programmes to support the prompt delivery of
remittances from migrant workers and programmes to finance folk
arts, music and crafts (Section 1.2, DoS circular no 01, 1 June 2008,
Bangladesh Bank).
15 In 2009, the Bangladesh government issued a regulatory order
identifying 17 items that would qualify as CSR activities (SRO 270—
Law/2009, 15 January 2009, Government of Bangladesh). This was
later replaced by SRO 229—Law/Income tax/2011 which included
three more items.
16 This compares well with average CSR spending by FTSE 100
companies in 2011 (0.5 % of pre-tax profits).
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sports clubs with explicit political links. For instance,
Jamuna Bank and UCBL made donations to newly estab-
lished football clubs named after two brothers of the
incumbent prime minister.
The third highest increase was on the education sector.
This spending was mainly for scholarship programmes for
schools and universities in various parts of the country.
However, a significant chunk of CSR expenditure in this
segment went to comparatively well-off schools, univer-
sities and hospitals in Dhaka. Further investigation of these
CSR disclosures revealed that some of these institutions are
located in the home areas of members of parliament and
key board members mainly supporting the ruling party.
Disaster relief also increased. The most significant CSR
expenditures in the disaster management segment involved
the payment of compensation for the Nimtoli and BDR
tragedies. In addition, a number of banks made significant
donations to the prime minister’s relief fund for victims of
the 2009 cyclone. This also explains the sudden increase in
2010 in CSR spending on disaster management pro-
grammes. On the face of it, these donations do not appear
to be politically charged, but the promotional campaign of
their contributions does indicate the political use of CSR
disclosures. For instance, in most cases, reports of CSR
activities in this segment involved the publication of a
photograph of the bank’s chairman handing over a cheque
to the prime minister. Public displays of connections with
the prime minister and the ruling party are significant for
corporations, as will be discussed later.
Similar trends are found in the health and education
sector. Several banks made donations towards infrastruc-
tural development in established private hospitals owned
by powerful political leaders. Donations were also made to
organisations owned by or closely associated with minis-
ters and political leaders. For instance, IFIC bank donated
one million Taka (approximately US$12,700 @ 78.85 per
US$) to an eye hospital owned by the prime minister’s
health advisor. Al Arafah Bank has an English-medium
school named ‘‘Al Arafah International School’’; the
National Bank has established a school named ‘‘National
Bank Public School’’ in Dhaka; and Prime Bank has
sponsored a student studying in North South University, an
expensive private university in Dhaka.
The ‘‘other’’ segment includes CSR expenditures such
as investment in environmentally friendly banks. Disclo-
sures in this area were vague, and although a number of
banks mentioned policies regarding ‘‘green banking’’, no
specific examples of such actions were disclosed. Some
banks disclosed the financing of fuelling stations as CSR
activities, although these appear to have been profit-making
ventures. Some banks also made grants towards the
‘‘beautification’’ of Dhaka—a government initiative in
which major corporations are given responsibility for
maintaining parks in specific locations.
Table 2 Distribution of CSR
expenditure
Panel A: Distribution of CSR expenditure by segment (in million Taka)
2008 2009 2010 2011
Disaster relief 58.6 125.1 460.41 188.03
Education 30.5 94.8 400.79 612.88
Health 112.1 245.5 689.07 520.42
Sport 49.8 1.2 265.23 359.07
Arts and culture 0.8 0.3 328.91 171.52
Other 158.9 86.9 125.58 198.73
Total 410.70 553.80 2329.8 2188.3
% increase on previous year 34.84 320.69 -6.07
Panel B: Change in 2010 by segment
% increase Rank
Disaster relief 268 4
Education 322 3
Health 180 5
Sport 22,002 2
Arts and culture 109,536 1
Others 44 6
Source: Annual review of CSR expenditure, Bangladesh Bank, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
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These donations can be seen as philanthropic ventures.
It may also be argued that they do not necessarily concern
wider stakeholders and local communities but focus firmly
on the ruling party and its leaders. Bangladesh is one of the
countries most vulnerable to the effects of global climate
change. Sea levels are projected to rise by 20 cm, which
will seriously threaten the livelihoods of the Bangladeshi
population (NY Times 2014). A Bangladesh Bank (2008)
guideline identifies this as a priority area, and a tax
incentive has also been put in place; yet, the banks do not
appear to have engaged in any meaningful way. For
instance, two banks appear to mention it in their reports,
and ten banks announced the creation of risk funds in 2010.
Nevertheless, no tangible CSR spending was reported by
any of the banks during the study period. In contrast, we
see an exponential increase of CSR disclosure items
favoured by the ruling party.
Table 3 presents the most frequent CSR disclosure items
(four of them) by banking companies in Bangladesh
between 2009 and 2012. Table 4 lists some infrequent or
one-off CSR disclosure items.17 The disclosures most fre-
quently reported under CSR were financial assistance to
family members of victims of the Bangladesh Rifles revolt
(classified as ‘‘disaster management’’), followed by dona-
tions to the Liberation War Museum (classified as ‘‘art and
culture’’), donations to victims of the Nimtoli fire tragedy
(classified as ‘‘disaster management’’) and contributions to
autism causes (classified as ‘‘health’’). These disclosure
items were not only frequent but also the largest CSR cost
items reported in annual reports. Two recurring patterns/
themes emerged from the CSR disclosure items described
above—contributions supporting the ruling party’s agendas
and contributions to the personal projects of leaders. The
following section discusses these two themes in the context
of four key disclosure items.
Contributions Supporting the Ruling Party
Agendas
The two most frequent disclosure items in relation to the
ruling party’s agendas will be discussed below. This is to
illustrate why such items are deemed to be of a political
nature and support the ruling party’s agendas rather than
corporate philanthropic activities.
Donations Made to the Liberation War Museum
Between 2009 and 2012, there were 19 instances of
donations made by the sampled banking companies to the
Liberation War Museum in Dhaka. The minimum dis-
closed donation was Taka 0.50 million and the maximum
was Taka 10 million in a year. It should be mentioned that
the ruling party claims itself to be a pro-liberation force
and brands its opposition as an anti-liberation force.
Finding a permanent home for the Liberation War Museum
was an election promise of the ruling party. Construction of
the museum started during the 1996–2001 tenure of the
current government but was subsequently stalled by the
succeeding government. In order to meet its pre-election
commitments, the government needed to complete it before
2014, when the next general election was due.18 Soon after
the election of the current government in 2009, banks
began to make donations to the prime minister in aid of the
Liberation War Museum (UNB 2010; The Daily Star
2010c). Notably, in June 2011, the government included
donations to the Liberation War Museum on a list of CSR
activities (classified as ‘‘art and culture’’) qualifying for tax
exemption (GoB 2011).
Corporate donations to arts and culture are very com-
mon in countries such as the UK and the USA and rarely
articulated as a politically motivated CSR activity in the
literature (Campbell et al. 2002; Moore 1995). For several
reasons, contributions to war museum might be articulated
as a politically motivated CSR activity in our case. First,
donating to museums was not a usual CSR activity, given
that these banks had no history of contributing to any
museums. Banks’ interests in the Liberation War Museum
are noteworthy, as is the fact that most banks made exactly
the same donation for this specific purpose. For example,
Southeast Bank, EBL, IFIC Bank and Al Arafah Bank all
reported a donation of Taka 0.50 million as a contribution
towards the construction of the Liberation War Museum. It
might be argued that this was perhaps to gain tax exemp-
tions, but donations began even before the tax advantage
was put in place. Second, donations were made and dis-
closed in a particular way, for instance photographs with
the prime minister showing donations of money to the
Liberation Museum in annual reports, as well as newspaper
publicity. These public displays of contributions signal that
the banks sought to gain or strengthen political ties with the
ruling party from this particular CSR activity. A similar
17 This table is by no means an exhaustive list of one-off/infrequent
disclosure items. We present these items to demonstrate ways in
which banking companies use corporate social disclosures.
18 An election was held without the participation of the major
opposition party. Before the election, the heads of two dynasties—
Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina—bickered face-to-face over the
format of the elections. After the election, the situation deteriorated
further, taking the general population hostage with strikes, shutdowns
and political violence.
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feature appeared in other CSR disclosure items, as pre-
sented below.
Financial Assistance to Victims of the Bangladesh
Rifles (BDR) Revolt
On 25 February 2009, a mutiny by a section of BDR per-
sonnel resulted in the killing of 74 victims, including 57
army officers. The incident received worldwide media
attention, and the government was criticised for its failure
to limit the number of casualties. The ruling party, already
lacking a strong relationship with the armed forces com-
pared with that of its rival—Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BRAC 2008), was blamed for its inept handling of the
entire incident (The Economist 2009). The main rival party
also led by a family accused the government of plotting the
incident. The government tried to make amends by
announcing generous financial packages for family mem-
bers of the victims (The Financial Express 2009).
Not surprisingly, donations to the government to help
the families of victims of the BDR incident became a
recurrent ‘‘CSR’’ activity reported by the sampled banks.
For instance, the annual report of Southeast Bank (2012)
disclosed.
Following the tragic incident of brutal killing of
valiant army officers at the then BDR headquarters,
Southeast Bank pioneered an idea to stand by the
affected families. In accordance with our devised
formula, the bank, in collaboration with the
Government of Bangladesh, selected seven bereaved
families of the Shaheed (meaning ‘‘martyred’’) army
officers who embraced martyrdom at the carnage at
the BDR headquarters to stand by them. Each family
is being given Taka forty thousand per month total-
ling Taka 0.48 million in a year. The contribution for
the year 2012 was made through the honourable
Prime Minister amongst the recipients (Southeast
Bank Annual Report 2012, p. 106).
Donations by corporations to such tragedies are com-
mon in many settings, perhaps demonstrating their phi-
lanthropic activities to appease wider stakeholders. We
would argue that these CSR disclosures have political
motivations for two reasons. First, the way in which
donations were made to the victims is noteworthy. None of
the banks chose to make direct donations to families of the
BDR victims but opted to transfer money via the govern-
ment (or in the presence of the prime minister). Second, the
way in which the activities were disclosed in annual reports
is quite revealing. Often, the banks’ annual reports con-
tained photos of the bank chairman handing over a cheque
to the prime minister. In addition, photographs of banks’
donations to BDR victims given directly to the prime
minister were widely publicised in newspapers (Daily Sun
2012).
Both of these contributions to enhancing the ruling
party’s position in wider society can be seen as attempts to
connect with the political leadership of the country perhaps
to seek out new ties and/or manage existing relationships.
This might be at the expense of other stakeholders, such as
employees or clients, or of other pro-poverty projects that
might otherwise have deserved priority. Therefore, by
Table 3 Most frequent CSR disclosures
Item Frequency
Donation to Liberation War Museum 19
Donation to BDR tragedy 17
Donation to victims of Nimtoli 16
Contributions to autism causes 14
Table 4 Some infrequent/one-off CSR disclosures
Disclosure items Names of banks Political links
Donation to freedom fighter memorial Bank Asia Current Regime’s political
commitment
Donation to Father of the Nation memorial trust Dutch Bangla bank The current PM is the daughter of
Father of the Nation
Donation to children’s foundation/football clubs named after family
members of the Prime Minister
Rupali Bank (SCB),
Jamuna Bank, ICBL
Prime Minister’s Kin
Financial assistance for publishing book and producing a documentary on
the life of the Father of the nation
Southeast Bank, Rupali
Bank (SCB)
The current PM is the daughter of
Father of the Nation
Donation to hospital owned by the health minister IFIC Bank Current ruling regime
Donation to schools in the electoral constituency of the Prime Minister Basic Bank, Mercantile
Bank
Prime Minster
Daylight Savings Campaign UCBL Prime Minster’s project
Donation for advertisement for Prime Minister’s South–South award Southeast Bank Prime Minister
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures, Traditionalism and Politics: A Story from a… 421
123
making donations to the Liberation Museum or the BDR
tragedy in the guise of CSR activities, the bank managers
fostered trust from the ruling party.
Contributions to Personal Projects of Leaders
Tables 3 and 4 also report items which are directly asso-
ciated with the personal projects of powerful leaders in the
ruling party. Infrequent or one-off items such as donations
to children’s foundations or football clubs named after
family members of the prime minister, a donation to a
hospital owned by the health minister, and donations to
schools in the electoral constituency of the prime minister
are clearly related to personal projects. The two most fre-
quently reported disclosure items associated with personal
projects will be discussed below to illustrate why these
items are deemed to be of a political nature.
Donations to Victims of the Nimtoli Tragedy
On 3 June 2010 a tragic fire in Nimtoli, a densely populated
part of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, killed 116 vic-
tims. Owing to the gravity of the incident and its politically
sensitive location (in an electoral constituency held by the
ruling party), it received huge media publicity. The media
reported as a side-line the tragic event of two sisters who
were due to get married on that day but lost their families
in the fire. This news also attracted significant media
attention and the prime minster announced that she would
take responsibility for making the wedding arrangements
for the two sisters. Accordingly, the wedding ceremony
was arranged at the prime minister’s official residence on 9
June, and pictures of the brides, with the prime minister,
appeared on the front pages of every major newspaper in
the country (The Daily Star 2010a). With banks’ assistance
(Rupali Bank in particular), the prime minister handed over
Taka 100,000 to each of 98 affected families (The Daily
Star 2010b). Rather than making donations directly to the
victims, most banks chose to make such donations through
the prime minister’s relief fund. As EBL’s annual report
(2010 p. 94) states: ‘‘EBL contributed Taka 0.5 million to
the prime minister’s relief fund as a donation for the
Nimtoli victims’’.
In an address to parliament, the prime minister also
asked for donations for the Nimtoli tragedy. Although less
significant than other natural calamities that occur fre-
quently in Bangladesh, the tragedy received huge attention
owing to the involvement of key political figures. Financial
grants were made by the banks and reported in their annual
reports as ‘‘to brides in the presence of the PM as a token of
compassion towards them’’ (Rupali Bank Annual Report
2010).
Although in this particular tragedy the prime minister
made a personal plea, it is not uncommon for corporations
to contribute to local issues. Previous studies located in
non-traditional settings have argued that corporations focus
on giving to local communities (Campbell et al. 2002;
Porter and Kramer 2002). On the face of it, this may sound
very natural and apolitical. Nevertheless, we would argue
for two reasons that the way in which donations are made
and disclosed in annual reports is political in nature. First,
while corporations have a responsibility to contribute to the
community or to victims of accidents, in this scenario
direct contributions to the victims were needed, but instead
bankers chose to contribute through the ruling party leader.
Second, the banks in question had not previously donated
to any disaster programmes before this incident. This is
interesting because fire tragedy is unfortunately not
uncommon in Bangladesh, yet the donations raised, dis-
closed and publicised for this particular tragedy were
unique.
Donations Made to Autistic Children
Donations to autistic children (classified under CSR
activities in the education sector) were a particularly
recurrent feature of CSR disclosures by banking companies
in 2012. Interestingly, on all ten occasions on which such
donations were made, the contributions went to a particular
school named ‘‘Proyash’’, run by the Bangladesh Army.
Donations to autistic children are undeniably a noble
humanitarian cause, and should be appreciated and
encouraged. However, a particular point of concern in
these cases was the involvement of the prime minister’s
daughter who, in 2011, was appointed the chair of the
autism advisory committee to the government of Bangla-
desh. Subsequently, several high-profile events were
organised by the government, attended by the prime min-
ister herself along with her daughter. Notably, the only
bank that made donations to Proyash in all 4 years was
Trust Bank—a bank run by the Bangladesh Army—
whereas for the other banks it appeared to be a one-off
payment. Contributions to the autism cause increased fol-
lowing the appointment of the prime minister’s daughter.
In addition to the above most frequent disclosure items,
banks disclosed and publicised a number of other social
activities directly linked with the current prime minister
and her kin. For instance, expenditure on advertising the
prime minister’s achievements, such as receiving a
‘‘South–South’’ award (ICT development award), was
designated as CSR activity in Southeast Bank’s annual
report. Donations were also made by the same bank
towards highlighting the image of Bangabandhu—the
father of the nation (SEBL annual report 2012, p. 108).
Similarly, Basic Bank declared donations to educational
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institutions in Gopalganj district, the prime minister’s
electoral constituency, ‘‘on behalf of the prime minister’’
(Basic Bank 2012). UCBL (2012) reported that they were
the ‘‘only company to support the government’s daylight
savings campaign’’, widely believed to be the idea of the
prime minister.
Clearly, contributions to the prime minster’s favourite
projects seem to be the most popular CSR activities for
banks. Over the 4 years, all sampled banking companies, as
part of their CSR activities, posted at least one photograph
showing their chairmen handing over cheques to the prime
minister as donations. These CSR activities included
mainly projects that the prime minister, her kin and fictive
kin had endorsed at national and local levels (see Tables 3
and 4). Several banks made photographs with the prime
minister a recurring annual theme in their CSR reports. The
annual report of one commercial bank (Standard Bank)
actually referred to the prime minister as the jananetri
(meaning ‘‘leader of the masses’’)—a political term used
only by members of the Awami League to refer to their
leader.
Overall, our empirical analysis suggests that the central
bank’s measures to influence banks’ CSR activities seem to
have limited impact. Environmentally friendly projects and
other incentivised areas of investment have not taken off.
Banks do not seem to be interested in taking advantage of
fiscal regulations unless CSR activities are connected with
the ruling party. The absence of any reference to global
standards, such as the IFC’s framework and the GRI, is
noteworthy. The banks have neither adopted nor imple-
mented the IFC’s suggested social and environmental
performance frameworks, nor have they considered GRI as
their reporting framework (also reported in Khan et al.
2011). This contrasts sharply with the idea that political
CSR is a consequence of ‘‘globalisation’’. Instead, this
suggests that political CSR is crucially dependent on state
politics. In the case of Bangladesh, state politics are a tug
of war between two family-led political parties.
Discussion
Theoretically, this study sought to develop a broader
understanding of the political perspectives of CSR disclo-
sures in traditional settings drawing on Weber’s notion of
‘‘traditionalism’’. Following the Weberian methodologies,
this paper has examined the historical and political con-
ditions of Bangladeshi society, showing that social and
political lives are heavily influenced by family culture. Not
surprisingly, we have found the strong presence of family-
led political parties. The current prime minister is the
daughter of the founder of the ruling party. Family kin and
fictive kin are the powerful leaders of the party. Heredity
politics are the backbone of Bangladeshi democracy, and
ultimate accountability seems to lie with family, exhibiting
features of traditionalism in action. Politics pursued by the
two leading political parties have also led to the creation of
a culture that many businessmen believe actively seeking
and maintaining political ties will help them expand their
business.
We have found that all banks adopted politically
charged disclosure strategies. We have examined whether
elements of traditionalism provide deeper insights into
politically charged CSR disclosures reported by banking
companies in Bangladesh. Several key elements of tradi-
tionalism appear to constitute traditional societies, includ-
ing personal loyalty and the public display of loyalty, the
master–servant relationship, and obedience to personal
rather than formal authority. We have demonstrated that
these elements of traditional societies provide an under-
standing of why banks (with or without explicit political
linkages with the ruling party) have deployed a particular
form of CSR disclosure strategy.
Banks have clearly ignored Bangladesh Bank (2008)’s
priority area of CSR and tax incentivised CSR items but
rather focused on disclosures associated with the personal
projects of leaders or the ruling party agendas. Viewed
through a Weberian lens, it is understandable why com-
panies devote significant effort to individuals rather than
wider stakeholders. Family and chief (head of the family),
kin, fictive kin and relatives are the essential fabric of
traditional society. Thus, it is unsurprising to see CSR
directed towards individual or family. Traditionalism
drives a subject to be loyal to the chief in order to be seen
to be trustworthy (Weber 1947). These elements of tradi-
tionalism become more apparent when we examine in
greater detail some of the key disclosure items during the
4-year period.
We have demonstrated that four key disclosure items
such as donations to Liberation Museum, financial assis-
tance to victims of the BDR revolt and Nimtoli fire tragedy
and donations to the cause of autistic children are politi-
cally motivated. These donations either promoted ruling
party’s agendas or powerful leaders’ personal projects. We
argue that underlying conditions of traditional societies
have enthused banking companies to select suitable dis-
closures to seek out and strengthen political ties with the
ruling party. For instance, contributions to BDR victims
and Liberation Museum by banking companies can be seen
as a way of enhancing the ruling party’s position in wider
society. From the banks’ point of view, failure to make
such donations might jeopardise the master–servant rela-
tionship. Therefore, by making donations to the Liberation
Museum or the BDR tragedy in the guise of CSR activities,
the bank managers fostered trust from the party. Those
donations were very well publicised by the companies in
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the annual reports and newspapers. Such public displays of
loyalty by banks are consistent with Weber’s (1947) defi-
nition of a traditional society, in which domination, exer-
cised by an individual or a family, is based primarily on
relations of personal loyalty. This is also a perfect
demonstration of how to serve the ‘‘master’’, in the
Weberian sense, in difficult times.
Contributions to personal projects such as donations to
autism cause or Nimtoli fire tragedy may appear to be usual
corporate philanthropic activities. We have argued that
they were more than just appeasing the wider stakeholders;
the donations were made as a vehicle to demonstrate loy-
alty to the person in authority. In a traditional society, as
expected, individual economic units are geared primarily
towards satisfying the needs and preferences of the
‘‘master’’ or family/clan (Dyball and Valcarcel 1999). It is
rational for banks to engage in CSR activities particularly
favoured by the ruling family, while the needs and pref-
erences of state institutions fail to attract the same atten-
tion. As Weber (1968) states, the ‘‘master’’ is expected to
do good turns, governed by an ethical sense of equity or of
utilitarian expediency. That the ‘‘master’’ looks after his
‘‘subjects’’ is clearly evidenced by the fact that many
bankers receive benefits in the form of business or political
opportunities when they arise. For bankers, it is much more
materially significant to serve political masters rather than
complying with global standards for CSR disclosures or
taking advantage of central bank incentives.
Donations to personal projects were also publicly dis-
played in media and newspapers. In Weber’s terms, this
public display of loyalty to the ruling family puts compa-
nies in good stead: ‘‘Obedience is not owed to enacted
rules, but to the person who occupies a position of
authority… who has been chosen for such a position’’
(Weber 1947, p. 341). Banks in Bangladesh not only
sought to disclose CSR activities in their annual reports but
also went further, such as printing photographs in public
media, and handing cheques to political leaders rather than
spending directly on communities. This has happened
especially where low-level disclosures of corporate affairs
are the norm (Uddin and Choudhury 2008). Public displays
of political connections seem to be more important in
Bangladesh than the low-profile donations of investment
bankers19 to political parties common in the Western
world. Fuller explanations of these types of corporate
conduct require the notion of traditionalism to be invoked.
We would argue that the underlying nature of politically
charged corporate disclosures is rooted in traditional atti-
tudes such as personal loyalty, comradeship and the
master–servant relationship. In Weberian terms, the insti-
tutions of the community, market and state are conjoined in
traditional societies, making the institutions of family and
clans powerful and enduring.
In an ideal/rational setting, the state plays the conven-
tional roles of controller, provider of external infrastructure
and receiver of levies (Fassin and Gosselin 2011), and is
responsible for creating accountability in the financial
sector. In a traditional setting, the state or state-like bodies
are overpowered by family and their kin. Bankers draw
power from the ruling party and are often able to ignore/
avoid rational measures introduced by state bodies such as
the central bank in Bangladesh. Actors within the company
are not always necessarily related to families leading the
political parties, but manage to exploit the familial rela-
tionships of the political parties. This observation is in line
with previous studies on accounting practices in traditional
societies (Uddin 2009; Dyball and Valcarcel 1999). Man-
nan (1992) argues that political parties maintain loyal
supporters in various positions within the institution and
thereby personalise state bodies. Thus, banks have little
interests to appease wider stakeholders given the nature
and power of the state and state-like bodies. This is much
more convenient for banks to focus on political leaders,
parties and families. Corporation’s wider stakeholder
legitimacy for CSR is very weak in Bangladesh.
We argue that it is unsurprising that bankers use dis-
closures to demonstrate their loyalty to the family in power
as this is seen as the ultimate accountability. Account-
ability to the wider public or state bodies is seen as formal
and symbolic, whereas loyalty to individuals and families
in power is real. Banks are seen more as a household, in
which disclosure is considered to be revealing the family’s
secrets. Yet, in this secretive world, the fact that banks are
lining up to disclose specific social activities is quite
revealing. Disclosure within the family or to the master (in
this case the family in power) has greater value than dis-
closure for legal reasons. We argue that traditionalism is at
work here, weakening rational guidelines for disclosure.
Conclusions
This paper concludes by considering the research questions
set out earlier. Do corporations in traditional settings
exploit CSR disclosures to seek out and manage political
ties and, if so, how? How do we explain the political nature
of CSR disclosures? This paper has drawn on the Weberian
notion of ‘‘traditionalism’’ to shed light on the nature of
CSR disclosures made by banks in Bangladesh.
The study has examined the nature of and changes to
CSR between 2008 and 2010. We found that, in the
banking companies over the period of study, apparently
19 For instance, Barack Obama has received US$3.4 million in
campaign contributions from investment banks alone, while George
Bush received about US$2.5 million (www.influenceexplorers.com).
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neutral, corporate, philanthropic activities disclosed and
promoted in CSR reports are inextricably linked to pow-
erful leaders’ personal projects and the ruling party’s
agendas. For instance, contributions to the Liberation War
Museum suddenly appeared in company accounts, and
bankers (owner-managers) were lined up to contribute to
the prime minister’s relief funds for tragic events such as
the BDR mutiny and the Nimtoli fire tragedy, making
donations to the prime minister’s brother’s memorial fund,
and even funding a biography of the prime minister’s
father.
Theoretically, we have argued that the emergence of
politically charged CSR disclosures provides new insights
if examined in the context of the political regime and tra-
ditionalism. We have discussed historical and political
conditions in Bangladesh to understand the development of
Bangladeshi society and the dominance of the ruling party
in economic and political affairs. We have demonstrated
elements of traditional societies, including personal loyalty
and the public display of loyalty, the master–servant rela-
tionship, and obedience to personal rather than formal
authority, provide an understanding of politically charged
disclosures by banks.
The paper makes several contributions. First, the paper
contributes to disclosure studies where political motiva-
tions of corporate disclosure rarely discussed. The paper
specifically contributes to the critical tradition in political
CSR research. Drawing on disclosures, the paper demon-
strates that corporations’ disclosure patterns are signifi-
cantly dependent on seeking and maintaining ties with the
ruling party. Although not involving CSR, similar corpo-
rate behaviour is reported in Dieleman and Boddewyn’s
(2012) work. This also runs contrary to the established
normative understanding of the political roles of corpora-
tions (Scherer et al. 2006, 2009).
Second, the paper extends the debate on political CSR by
demonstrating that the role of family and familial values at
the organisational and national levels can be very important
when it comes to CSR disclosure and activities in societies
that share characteristics with Weber’s understanding of
traditionalism. The Weberian notion of traditionalism is
useful in understanding the complex links between politics
and families and their influence on corporate practices such
as CSR. This notion of the power of a family-led state over
corporations does not chime with the idea of the diminished
role of the state (whether familial or not) and the political
CSR activities of corporations (Scherer and Palazzo 2011),
but offers support for work by Whelan and his colleagues
(Whelan 2012; Whelan and Muthuri forthcoming), who
argue that pressures at the national and intra-organisational
level are often much more significant than transnational
pressures in promoting and enforcing CSR standards. The
paper questions the idea of stakeholder legitimacy for
corporations in traditional settings contrary to ‘mainstream’
political CSR writings that concern with wider stakeholders
would be considered ‘legitimate’ globally.
Finally, this paper has opened the way to further
research on politically motivated CSR studies in both
developed and traditional societies. It would be useful to
examine cross-cultural studies on CSR disclosures, linking
them with political motivations, human rights, bribery and
corruption. It has also been suggested that CSR activities
and disclosures vary with different legal, political and
economic contexts across countries. One aspect of these
differences may be the way in which domestic regulatory
regimes have historically been shaped by colonial regimes.
Weberian concepts such as rationality versus traditionalism
may help shed light on differences in corporate social
behaviour in different contexts. We need to gain a better
understanding of the role of familial relationships and
traditions in broader governance issues, including CSR
disclosures, in relation to corruption and human rights,
especially in traditional societies. These areas, though
important, remain under-investigated and under-theorised.
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